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Regenerative Medicine, Resource and Regulation:  
Lessons Learned from the remedi Project.  
 
Summary 
The successful commercialisation of regenerative medicine products provides a unique 
challenge to the manufacturer due to a lack of suitable investment / business models and a 
constantly evolving regulatory framework. The resultant slow translation of scientific 
discovery into safe and clinically efficacious therapies is preventing many potential products 
from reaching the market. This is despite the need for new therapies that may reduce the 
burden on the world’s healthcare systems and address the desperate need for replacement 
tissues and organs. The collaborative Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council 
(EPSRC) funded remedi project* was devised to take a holistic but manufacturing-led 
approach to the challenge of translational regenerative medicine in the UK. Through strategic 
collaborations and discussions with industry and other academic partners, many of the 
positive and negative issues surrounding business and regulatory success have been 
documented to provide a remedi-led perspective on the management of risk in business and 
the elucidation of the regulatory pathways, and how the two are inherently linked. This paper 
represents the findings from these discussions with key stakeholders and the research into 
best business and regulatory practices.  
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*remedi is an EPSRC innovative manufacturing grand challenge designed to drive step changes in 
the capability, impact and excitement of UK manufacturing research through a consortium of 
academic and industrial stakeholders.   
Scope 
The scope of the term Regenerative Medicine (RM) as used in this manuscript, has been 
defined by the industrial partners and collaborators that were consulted in the research and 
development of these findings. The majority of these companies were developing products 
that the authors of this manuscript have interpreted as having Regenerative Medicine (RM) 
applications, in that they either are being used or could be used, for the repair, regeneration or 
replacement of human tissue. These products came in two categories; (1) products composed 
of either; viable human cells or tissues for therapeutic use or (2) non-viable biomaterials that 
would form tissue repair scaffolds (medical devices). Therefore, this manuscript will refer to 
these products as RM products.  
 
Why is Regenerative Medicine Different? 
As an industry that reinvented itself in the wake of the failed tissue engineering “boom” of 
the 1990s, RM is still searching for the right formula that will bring significant healthcare 
benefits and resultant commercial success to the world’s major markets. Evidence for this 
statement comes from the relative scarcity of viable RM products in the marketplace [1], 
especially considering the large amount of public and private money that has been invested in 
order to research and develop these products over the last 10 years. This is especially 
apparent in the US where companies such as Tengion and Geron have raised 100s of millions 
of dollars between them, even though neither yet has an FDA-approved product on the 
market [101-103]. In the UK, the situation is more worrying still, as there are currently no 
UK developed RM products beyond the clinical trials process, with little private investment 
available despite significant public funding into stem cell research [2][104]. The combination 
of these factors resulted in the simple conclusion that scientific discovery was not being 
translated into clinical and commercial success. This lack of translational success was the 
rationale behind the UK-based collaborative EPSRC-funded remedi project in 2005 [105].  
 
One of the initial objectives of the remedi project was the identification of the unique 
challenges that makes the commercialisation of these living cell and tissue products different 
from conventional pharmaceuticals, in terms of manufacturing, financing and regulation. 
During its relatively brief history, tissue engineering, and then RM, has relied on many of the 
principles and business models that have proved to be successful in the more established 
healthcare industries such as pharmaceuticals or medical devices. However, unlike these 
well-established industries, which are characterised by the presence of large multi-nationals, 
RM is dominated by small to medium enterprises (SMEs), many from an academic 
environment that are operating in a high-risk, high-cost and relatively low investment space. 
Furthermore, this is compounded by a lack of legislative understanding in some areas, a result 
of the fast moving nature of the science and the ever evolving regulatory framework. 
Therefore, it is crucial that SMEs in the field of RM place significant emphasis on their early 
stage due diligence processes before beginning down the long road to commercialisation. We 
call this period “phase 0”, as it comes before the product development process and represents 
an opportunity for a small business to prevent the use of precious resource on a commercially 
flawed technology, as well as allowing for the identification of areas of weakness within the 
business case. Equally, by providing evidence of this early stage assessment to investors, a 
significant amount of risk has been taken out of the equation, thereby making the business 
more attractive. The key to building a sound business case during phase 0 is the development 
of an in-house customer requirements document that indicates the key areas that should be 
addressed in order to satisfy those requirements. Even if investment has been sought 
successfully and the product development process has started in earnest, the principles of 
phase 0 must be taken forward with the number one priority being to continue to meet each 
customer’s requirements and thus, reduce the risk of failure.   
 
The Importance of the Value Proposition  
Future success in the regenerative medicine field will depend on a SME’s ability to manage 
risk, attract investment and achieve key technical milestones. In order to fulfil these goals, 
companies working in the RM space must satisfy the multiplicity of customers or 
stakeholders through the demonstration of value in the product and the parts of the business 
that are most relevant to each of them. It is essential that all of the potential customers for the 
business are identified, with the major requirements of each listed in Table 1. The 
demonstration of value is best described as the value proposition (VP) which can be defined 
as ‘the benefits offered to the customer, minus the cost and risk’. The VP is arguably the most 
vital part of the business case as it provides the framework for all of the other elements and 
addresses all of the customer requirements. There are three core elements to a successful VP; 
quality, safety and efficacy (in an addressable market), although there may be a dependence 
on maximising cost-effectiveness in certain markets. Demonstration of these three elements 
at key stages in the development of the business / product will provide evidence to investors 
that the business / product is commercially viable, thus reducing risk and enhancing the 
probability of a satisfactory return on investment (ROI). The most important milestones 
associated with gaining investment are; (1) the successful completion of animal proof of 
concept studies, (2) the completion of “first in man” or phase I clinical trials and (3) 
regulatory approval. These key value inflection points demonstrate safety (through successful 
human and animal studies) and quality (built into the process in the form of good laboratory 
practice (GLP) and good manufacturing practice (GMP)). Finally, regulatory approval shows 
that the major barrier i.e. Phase III clinical trials, have been successfully completed and that 
the product is sufficiently efficacious. Without any of these key value demonstrators, the 
company only has IP and in the field of cellular therapeutics, the true value of IP has yet to be 
determined.  
 
Showing reimbursement value may be the most challenging part of the VP, as the 
requirements for efficacy and cost-effectiveness are relative to any incumbent technology and 
market size. Therefore, SMEs need to assess the relative efficacy needed to achieve cost 
effectiveness. This will determine both the reimbursement flexibility and acceptable cost of 
goods sold (COGS) and thus, determine the pricing structure and resultant ROI. New 
enabling technologies may be the key to reducing COGS that are driven by R & D costs, such 
as the removal of bottlenecks from the manufacturing process or cheaper / faster testing 
methods. However, reducing COGS during the R & D phase is challenging, as much of the 
costs are incurred through achieving regulatory compliance / approval and are therefore “non-
negotiable”. Due to this, emphasis will be shifted onto the efficacy of the product, placing a 
heavy burden on those SMEs that develop products to replace the current standard of care.  
 
Business Models: Product or Service? 
As things stand, RM companies that are looking to develop cellular products are largely left 
with the “do it yourself” (DIY) or “go it alone” model, as there are currently few buyers and 
exit strategies. This situation is largely due to the recent global financial crisis, followed by 
the lack of revenue streams for big pharma and subsequent downsizings. One example of this 
is Intercytex, where the idea was to take Cyzact, Intercytex’s allogeneic wound- healing 
product, to market and sell it without partnering, as there was no interest from big pharma. 
Even though Cyzact did not ultimately get regulatory approval due to a failed Phase III trial,  
significant investment and growth was achieved over the life span of the company including 
the completion of a number of successful Phase I and II clinical trials [106]. However, it is 
likely that a new investment / business model will need to be created for RM products. 
Companies may now feel compelled to make RM more cost-effective by reducing COGS and 
thus pricing, such is the worry that they will not get sufficient investment or reimbursement, 
which are both discussed later in the manuscript. However, these are potentially high value 
products and should not be sold short.  
 
Autologous therapies are viewed with some scepticism by investors as the real value is seen 
by many to still be in the process as there is a blurring between the product and the clinical 
procedure. This raises doubt over the actual role of a RM company in the field of autologous 
therapies. For example, many things affecting the value of the product (process) may be 
outside the control of the company, e.g. training healthcare professionals. This raises 
questions about the business model and the source of the ROI, as these products may more 
closely relate to a service-based offering. A commonly held perception, or perhaps 
misconception, is that autologous products can only fit into a service-based model as they are 
not traditional “off the shelf” products. However, autologous therapies can be products if they 
are branded as such. For example, Carticel® was branded as a product by Genzyme in the US 
and similarly ChondroCelect® is also being marketed as a product in Europe by Tigenix, 
despite both being autologous cartilage repair treatments that cannot be used off the shelf in 
the traditional sense. In addition, as well as the biological advantages of using cells from the 
same donor, autologous cells may offer a less complex route to providing a RM product as 
there may be less requirement for manipulation, because of the possibility of replacing them 
in the same surgical procedure. However, cell therapy products are costly to develop and 
manufacture, thus autologous products may not work in some contexts where large-scale, 
batch manufacturing processes are used as they do not have the same economy of scale as 
allogeneic therapies.  
 
Gaining Private Investment  
Before submitting a business plan or making a pitch to investors, a company must select and 
prepare thoroughly for investors who are active in the RM or biotechnology space, as they are 
more likely to be realistic in their expectations of the business. Even if a company is still at 
phase 0, they should already be involved in a selling process in order to secure investment as 
soon as possible. The company also needs to understand what they are selling, as otherwise 
they will not gain the confidence of investors when making a pitch. In order to understand the 
product, it is important to understand the market, what the alternatives are and what price the 
market is prepared to pay. Whilst a strong pitch is essential, it must be assumed that the 
investor either understands, or has the capacity to understand, both the technical and the 
business concepts in equal measure. For example, it should not be assumed that the science is 
the difficult part and requires most of the brainpower and the business is of lesser importance. 
Therefore, if a scientist is to take the role of CEO in a small start-up company, they should be 
as good as a CEO / salesperson as they are a scientist. 
 
There are three important components when negotiating with investors over the amount of 
cash required; (1) the value of the business and (2) the amount that you actually want to raise 
and (3) the financial status of the business. An overvaluation of the business will raise alarm 
bells in the mind of the investor and suggest that due consideration has not been given to the 
size of the market nor the costs of building a business, thus further increasing the risk. 
Equally, an underestimation of the company’s value will place doubt in the mind of the 
investor with regard to their potential ROI and may result in the investor wanting a greater 
equity share than is desirable. Most new start-up and spin-out companies will be looking to 
raise private money on the back of some initial grant or seed funding and it is important to 
not let that money run dry before approaching private investors. This principle is the same 
during every funding round, as it important to negotiate from a position of strength i.e. nine 
months of money left in the business is better than three months of money left.  Obviously, 
with private investors, the obligation is to produce a significant ROI, so there will be pressure 
from day one to meet milestones against progress.   
 
Venture Capitalists (VCs) invest private funds that are raised from any number of limited 
partners [2]. Whilst all VCs are primarily interested in gaining the best ROI possible, it 
should be noted that there are varying time scales between VCs and their priorities might 
change over time. Most VC funds are 10-year life funds i.e. they last for 10 years from the 
start of the cycle. As a result, early stage deals i.e. those in the first three years of the cycle, 
are more likely as this is when the VCs are looking to invest most of their capital. Therefore, 
it is important to find out at when the fund cycle started. This 10-year plan places enormous 
constraint on developers of cell therapies, as they are unlikely to commercialise their products 
in this time. Returns within this length of time are only likely to come from an acquisition or 
an initial public offering (IPO) i.e. through the DIY model, so there must be significant value 
built into the business plan within the first 10 years. It may also be diligent to approach the 
CEOs of companies that a potential venture fund has invested in, as they may be able to 
provide an insight into the suitability of a VC fund.  
 
Avoiding Cash Burn 
In order to minimise cash burn in a small company, a constant review of human resources is 
required, especially important in the field of RM where investment is tight and the costs of 
development are relatively high. Initially, the CEO covers many roles, so it is best to hire 
additional staff incrementally and not to bring in expensive specialists too early. This form of 
lean development does present limitations, as with less money the business has to be more 
focussed and cannot over-diversify. In contrast, having more money available allows a 
company to “set more hares running” and gives them more chance of one being successful 
e.g. the big pharma model. However, this is a high-risk strategy for start-ups with limited 
resource, as the failure of a single product may prevent much needed resource being in place 
for the development of others. An example of this is Intercytex, where the cost of developing 
their lead product Cyzact® drew resource away from their large product pipeline, thus 
making these other products dependent upon Cyzact’s success. Unfortunately, Cyzact was 
not successful and this ultimately resulted in the failure of Intercytex’s “large pipeline” 
approach. Like large product pipelines, technology platforms can be very valuable in certain 
cases, but there must be a robust risk management process in place, as focus and 
diversification requires careful balancing. 
 
Another way to avoid cash burn for university spin-outs is to remain in shelter for as long as 
possible. This way, much of the initial research and proof of concept work can be done using 
grant funding e.g. from sources such as the National Institute for Health (NIH) in the US, 
provided that IP rights are negotiated and there is sufficient value left for the business. 
Essentially, it is in the best interests of all of the stakeholders that the company is successful, 
so this negotiation should not result in a lack of agreement between the involved parties. It 
should also be remembered that the true value of much of the IP in RM, particularly in stem 
cell technologies as mentioned earlier, is yet to be established. Therefore, protecting IP 
should not come at the cost of the business - unless it is absolutely imperative and there are 
funds available to defend the IP if needed. There are limitations to staying in shelter as many 
commercial activities cannot be undertaken on certain grants that are intended to further 
academic research e.g. clinical trials and regulatory submissions. It should also be stressed 
that public sources of funding should only be used as a catalyst for growth and the generation 
of value in a business, they should not be seen as a way of taking a product to market. 
However, in addition to the development of IP, much of the pre-clinical due diligence for a 
potential new spin-out can be carried out within a University, such as early animal studies, an 
early assessment of the potential market and some investigation into the potential clinical 
utility of a new technology.  
 
The Regulatory Framework 
The regulatory requirements can be used to drive the innovation of new RM products, with 
those regulations that provide the least burden providing a faster route to market. For 
example, this may be due to reduced or in certain cases non-existent  requirement to show 
safety and efficacy in clinical trials  for Class II(a and b) (EU only), Class II (US only) and 
Class III medical devices (EU and US) (Figure 1). However, this is likely to change as the 
complexity and potential safety risk of devices increase to meet the clinical demand. The 
medical device pathways are not always relevant to RM and are limited in application as a 
device cannot contain viable cells or tissues, although there have been historical exceptions 
i.e. before the regulatory pathways for cellular products were clearly defined. However, there 
are still alternatives to the clinical trials route without the need to use the device pathways. 
For example, in the US there are three levels of regulation concerning cell- and tissue-based 
products, with the level of regulatory burden being proportional to the level of manipulation 
carried out and thus, the risk to the patient [3, 4]. Those products that involve the removal and 
replacement of autologous cells or tissues within the same surgical procedure are not 
regulated under 21 CFR 1271 (Human Cellular, Tissue, and Tissue-based Products or 
HCT/Ps) and provide regulatory ‘freedom’. The price for this freedom is that it becomes 
difficult to justify the need for a any commercial intervention when there is little or no 
processing or manufacturing required. The second level of regulation is for those products 
that are minimally manipulated, intended for homologous use, do not have a systemic effect, 
and include tissues other than bone marrow [5]. These are regulated as HCT/Ps) under 
Section 361 of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). However, most HCT/Ps will not meet 
these strict criteria and will therefore be subject to the highest level of regulation; namely 
section 351 of the PHSA [5]. Under section 351, the HCT/P is subject to clinical assessment 
under an Investigational New Drug (IND) application before marketing approval can be 
granted through a successful Biologics License Application (BLA) [107]. This would include 
all allogeneic products unless they are for use in a first or second degree blood relative and 
fulfill the criteria for a section 361 product.  
 
To take advantage of these regulations, a product that meets both a clinical need and avoids 
the definition of a ‘section 351 product’ would represent a fast track to market and require 
minimal risk and resource to do so. However, the business model would have to reflect this, 
as only autologous products can avoid section 351 (with the exception of allogeneic products 
from blood relatives described above) and this would move away from a traditional product-
led route and rely on a more service-based offering, although there is some blurring between 
the two in this field. In terms of manufacturing, the FDA regulations also require all 
companies involved in the manufacture of section 351 products for human application to be 
GMP-compliant (21 CFR 210 and 211), as well as meet applicable parts of 21 CFR 1271 for 
good tissue practice . However, 21 CFR Parts 210 and 211 were originally written for 
conventional pharmaceuticals, which means that they will work on a case-by-case basis for 
these regenerative therapies and will require a more creative approach by the developer. The 
unique challenges that these products provide demands that the developer has frequent 
interactions with the regulator throughout the process. Ultimately the regulator is a key 
customer and should be treated as such with any meetings carefully planned and attended by 
the correct personnel. For example, if the purpose of the meeting is to discuss technical 
issues, the regulatory agencies will want to speak to scientists and not marketing or other 
non-technical personnel. 
 
In July 2008, the FDA issued new guidance intent on reducing the GMP burden, by 
exempting most products manufactured for phase I clinical trials from 21 CFR 211 [108]. 
However, this new regulatory guidance document made little reference to the manufacture of 
HCT/Ps, except for some limited recommendations on batch control and product testing. 
However, further draft guidance on GTP and GMP regulations for HCT/Ps that was 
published in January 2009 is still awaiting comment and may provide some additional 
information [107]. Perhaps even more significantly, a notice was published in the Federal 
Register in September 2009, indicating the FDA’s intention to codify GMP requirements for 
combination products with specific reference to HCT/Ps. This is in recognition of the 
potential for many cell- and tissue-based therapies to be combined with a device or additional 
scaffold and the complications that this may bring to the manufacturing process.  
 
Cell- and tissue-based products intended for human use are regulated as biological medicinal 
products in the EU under Directive 2001/83/EC, with additional provisions introduced via the 
Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products (ATMP) regulation, (EC/1394/2007). This regulation 
adds the definition of a tissue engineered product (TEP) to the existing definition of a somatic 
cell therapy (sCT) medicinal product already found in 2001/83/EC. Somatic cell therapy 
medicinal products are somatic living cells (autologous, allogeneic or xenogeneic) that have 
been substantially manipulated to attain a therapeutic, diagnostic or preventative effect 
through pharmacological, metabolic or immunological means. A TEP is one that contains or 
consists of engineered cells or tissues and is used for the regeneration, repair or replacement 
of human tissue. In order to meet the definition of an ATMP, a product must be substantially 
manipulated or not used for the same essential function in the recipient as in the donor. Any 
form of ex-vivo cell expansion is classed as a substantial manipulation but a number of other 
processes are not and they are listed in annex I of the ATMP regulation. If cell- or tissue-
based a product is not considered to be substantially manipulated and is used for the same 
essential function in the patient as in the donor, it will be exempt from the ATMP regulation 
and regulated under the EU Cells and Tissues Directives (Figure 1). As a consequence of this, 
such a product will be exempt from the centralised market authorisation procedure (as 
described in EC/726/2004) required for all ATMPs and is therefore subject to regulatory 
oversight by the relevant national competent authorities. [6]. Directive 2003/94/EC outlines 
the principles of GMP of medicinal products, with much of the required guidance found in 
the annexes in Volume 4 of the EudraLex system, including annex II, which provides the 
specific guidance for biological medicinal products and is currently being updated to enhance 
the GMP guidance for ATMPs [7]. In terms of special requirements, ATMP manufacturers 
are obliged to provide full product traceability from product manufacturing to patient 
administration [6]. Again, the best way to ensure regulatory compliance is through a 
sustained interaction with the European Medicines Agency (EMA), which offers a number of 
incentives for SMEs developing ATMPs. For example, scientific advice can be sought 
throughout the development process, with a 90% reduction in fees and a free certification 
service for quality and pre-clinical data can also be utilised in order to assist the transition 
from non-clinical to clinical studies.  
 
The clinical trials process is very different in the US and the EU and the regulatory pathways 
reflect this. Those wishing to carry out clinical studies in the EU must apply to the relevant 
competent authorities that operate within each individual member state of the EU in order to 
receive permission to commence a trial in that country. In the US, the regulations require the 
manufacturer to gain approval from both the FDA and an institutional review board (IRB) 
before a clinical trial involving a HCT/P can be commenced. An IRB is the US equivalent of 
an ethics committee in Europe; therefore IRBs are responsible for ensuring that the welfare 
and rights of patients are protected during clinical studies. However, the in the EU it must be 
remembered that each member state will have different ethics committees and different 
ethical viewpoints, so any potential multi-centre trial will have to be considered with this in 
mind, especially when ethically divisive technologies are involved in that trial e.g. human ES 
cells. One advantage in the EU clinical trials process in the EU is the new implementation of 
a clinical trials facilitation group (CTFG), which has been mandated to harmonise the clinical 
trials process across the EU, including harmonisation of the clinical trials assessment 
procedure between the different competent authorities in the EU [109]. Apart from the 
proliferation of regulations, patient numbers involved in the clinical trials process with these 
cell- and tissue-based therapies may also be dramatically less than in a traditional 
pharmaceutical product, and as such the clinical trial design is especially important. 
Companies may be limited to smaller data sets, and will need creative clinical study designs 
to gain maximum data from a smaller number of patients, combined with potentially higher 
costs for the study [4]. This remains an open issue in the design of clinical trials using viable 
human cells or any other complex biological product.  
 
Reimbursement and Adoption 
Potential payers and healthcare economists should ideally be consulted during the business 
planning stage in order to provide some assurances that the product or treatment has 
reimbursable potential.  Healthcare providers and payers will come in multiple forms 
dependent upon the selected markets but are likely to include a mixture of private and public 
payers that may operate with very different reimbursement models and thresholds. 
Effectiveness in an addressable market will be the first consideration of the payer but this will 
be relative to the current standard of care (if there is one) and the price they have to pay. Cost 
of goods sold (COGS) will directly impact on the pricing strategy for the product / treatment. 
Therefore, an assessment should be made of the costs incurred during each stage of the 
development and manufacture of the product or treatment. In addition to direct development 
costs, this calculation should take into account any third party involvement in the 
manufacturing process e.g. contract manufacturing or research organizations and any further 
implementation costs that will be incurred by the treatment e.g. training for healthcare staff, 
new equipment / facilities. However, as important as minimising COGS may be to the final 
pricing strategy, it is prudent for potential developers of RM products to look at meeting the 
un-met clinical need and placing the payer into a position where the demand for such a 
therapy or treatment would be overwhelming as this may negate any concerns over pricing 
and reducing cost.  
 
In the US, the main government organization responsible for health care insurance and 
reimbursement is the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) [110]. With regards 
to new medical products, there are three key elements critical for reimbursement: coverage, 
payment and coding. Coverage refers to the payers’ willingness to cover a product’s proven 
clinical effectiveness in specified indications [8]. Payment relates to how much the payer is 
willing to pay for the product, and is currently calculated and paid for on a prospective 
payment system instead of on a cost basis [9]. This system provides a predetermined, fixed 
amount for care providers based on the procedure. Therefore, depending on the complexity of 
the situation, the amount reimbursed may not reflect the actual cost of treatment [9]. 
Reimbursement codes allow for the transfer of information between the physician and the 
payer and pertain to the treatment that was provided. Significantly, codes are specific to 
surgical and medical procedures, therefore, CMS has now begun to collect cost data on cell 
processing procedures [10]. There is of course a wide variety of public payers in the US e.g. 
Blue Cross, Cigna, etc. that will not necessarily use the same metrics as the government 
controlled payers, thus providing a variety of potential market entry points.   
 
In Europe, there are a variety of private and public healthcare systems and payers and this 
requirement to negotiate multiple reimbursement pathways does reduce the attractiveness of 
the EU as a potential market. However, it does allow the developer of a RM product to have 
multiple attempts at gaining reimbursement and this can be an advantage as it is likely that 
each member state will use different metrics to assess new technologies, thus providing 
numerous other potential routes to market even after a negative opinion has been given. 
However, uptake in some member states may be significantly lower than in others and this is 
largely dependent on the type of healthcare system and the metrics that are used to judge new 
products. For example, in the UK, the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) has a broad mandate to set standards for the use of new technologies and procedures 
within the National Health Service (NHS) [11] by following NHS’s objective of maximising 
health gain from limited resources. Therefore, they assess new technologies on a number of 
factors, including: comparator technologies; economic evaluations; and measurement of 
health benefits in quality adjusted life years (QALYs) [12]. Cost-effectiveness is generally 
reported by an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, which is the ratio of the expected costs to 
the expected QALY [12]. While there is no set limit for cost per QALY, NICE does tend to 
operate within a band of £20,000 - £30,000 per QALY, which may be reduced even further in 
current economic conditions, as the threshold above which it is likely to reject a technology 
on the basis of cost-effectiveness [11]. Unfortunately, this economic focus may restrict 
reimbursement for cell- and tissue-based therapies, as they are likely to be associated with 
high up-front costs, as well as requiring expensive patient-specific processing costs to be 
routinely covered in the case of autologous therapies [13]. However, this is not necessarily a 
unique case – NICE does currently reimburse in vitro fertilisation treatments for specific 
individuals, albeit dependent on the policy of the Primary Care Trust responsible for the 
patient’s treatment [13].  
 
Without favourable opinion from clinicians, the product or treatment is far less likely to be 
adopted / reimbursed by healthcare providers / insurers. Positive opinion at this early stage of 
the product / treatment life cycle may be reflected when clinicians are consulted by healthcare 
providers and reimbursement decisions are being made. Therefore, the clinical community 
should be consulted as early as possible during phase 0 to ensure that: 
1. There is sufficient potential for clinical utility i.e. the treatment fills an un-met clinical 
need or it significantly improves on the current best treatment.  
2. The proposed treatment / intervention is ethically sound. 
3. There is some degree of clinical fit i.e. the treatment will not require a complete shift in 
the way that a surgical procedure is carried out or it makes the procedure more 
efficient. 
Clinical adoption of innovative techniques and methods can be seen to involve three 
separate phases: exposure to information; the choice of clinicians to evaluate the 
innovation; and, the final learning process where both the people and the organisation 
successfully adapt procedures to use the innovation effectively [14]. In the current 
information age, it is often not the exposure of information that limits the adoption, but 
instead the choice and the learning phases [14]. Furthermore, the main factors critical for 
the technology’s adoption are often seen as high patient demands, low training 
requirements and usage costs to the surgeon, as well as aggressive promotion of the 
technology by its manufacturer [15]. Following this, surgeon training and hospital 
construction needs to understand and acknowledge these RM products to enable wider 
technology adoption. For example, some cell- and tissue-based therapies may involve the 
need to manipulate cells close to the operating theatre where the tissue isolation takes 
place, which in turn requires cell processing facilities and trained staff in the same or 
nearby building. Government intervention may also be required to provide support for 
these new facilities, with hospitals already struggling to spend within their tight budgets 
and still provide a high quality of care. In the UK, there has been a large push for the NHS 
to actively support these cell-based treatments, not only as an early innovator, but also as a 
testing ground to translate these therapies from promising research into clinical applications 
[13]. 
 
Managing Setbacks 
Managing setbacks is likely to be of fundamental importance to developers of RM products; 
such is the history of past failures and developmental barriers and the resultant cash burn that 
ensues. Issues with regulatory submissions are one of the most common setbacks, especially 
with regard to approvals for clinical trials. For example, Geron were initially placed on 
clinical hold by the FDA for deficiencies in their pre-clinical data for their GRNOPC1 hESC 
(human Embryonic Stem Cell) product for the treatment of spinal cord injuries [111, 112]. 
This was detrimental to Geron’s value in the markets [113] but the lifting of that clinical hold 
should allow for a significant recovery. Conversely, UK-based stem cell company ReNeuron, 
have only had a fraction of the investment that Geron has received, despite also being 
involved in the development of a hESC therapeutic (RN001, for the treatment of stroke 
patients). When they were put on clinical hold by the FDA, ReNeuron moved quickly to seek 
clinical trials approval in the UK and was granted permission to start Phase I trials by the 
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) [114]. Moreover, if the UK 
Phase I trial is successful and the products is shown to be sufficiently safe to progress to 
Phase II, there is also the possibility that the FDA may relax their own stance on RN001, 
thereby turning what was once a setback, into a positive outcome.  
 
Not all setbacks are related to a lack of investment or regulatory approval. Organogenesis are 
the perfect example of a company that despite declaring  bankruptcy in 2002, later became 
successful with a product (Apligraf®) that is now reimbursed in the US and is likely to be 
launched in Europe within the next few years. However, one of the major contributing factors 
being cited for its original failure was a poor reimbursement strategy in the complicated US 
system [16]. Despite this, Organogenesis successfully came out of Chapter 11 in 2003 to re-
launch Apligraf with a more robust reimbursement strategy that has resulted in healthy 
products sales and growth of the company [17]. Despite not being a rousing success on the 
scale of many pharmaceutical and biotech firms, all forms of success are relative and 
Organogenesis is the most successful company currently operating in the field of RM. They 
are also a good example of how a company can recover from a major setback, and that a bad 
experience can make you stronger, and does not necessarily mean the death of the company. 
For example, whilst the failure of Intercytex’s lead product Cyzact during Phase III was far 
from a positive thing, Paul Kemp is now leading Intercytex as a limited company with a 
streamlined development strategy and a new focus. This has lead to the company gaining an 
orphan drug designation in Europe for the cell-based treatment of Epidermolysis Bullosa and 
a shift away from the US market for the time being to further focus the company [115].   
 
Conclusions 
The EPSRC-funded remedi project provided a unique opportunity to work with those in 
industry to both identify and provide solutions to, the issues that are most pertinent to the 
success or failure of the emerging RM industry. As part of this project, a work package was 
designed that focussed on the growth of both SMEs and the industry as a whole, whereby key 
business-related learning could be taken from key stakeholders and disseminated into the 
public domain. During this process, a number of key areas of concern were identified, most 
of which revolved around the lack of time and effort invested in the initial due diligence 
process undertaken by a new start-up or spin-out company before attempting to 
commercialize a new RM product. It is clear that companies developing RM products must 
look for innovative business models and commercial strategies and create a business case that 
includes key value adding steps that are both realistic and achievable. Without a solid value 
proposition that addresses the requirements of all the key customers of the business i.e. the 
regulator, investor, patient, payer and clinician, the developer is running the risk of using up 
precious time and resource on a product or technology that has significant commercial flaws 
and as a result, should not be taken through the development process. It is also essential that 
any company wishing to commercialise a RM product is acutely aware of the level of 
resource that is required to navigate the regulatory process (cost of quality and clinical trials) 
and where (a) resource can be saved and (b) assistance and advice can be sought from the 
regulatory agencies. Also fundamental to this due diligence process is the need to show that 
the product is likely to be sufficiently cost-effective, as those organisations that reimburse 
RM products will measure clinical impact against cost when making reimbursement 
evaluations. This does not imply that the product must be a blockbuster or carry a minimal 
price tag in order to get reimbursement, but there must be an addressable market that will 
permit the manufacturer to make money whilst also benefiting the healthcare system on a cost 
/ benefit basis.  Private investment in RM is scarce, and is more likely to come when value 
has already been generated in a business e.g. through regulatory approvals, efficacy data, etc. 
making the process of gaining that crucial initial investment even more difficult. This further 
emphasises the need for the early stage assessment of new RM products, as it will 
demonstrate to the investor that much of the risk has been removed or mitigated. The learning 
curve for companies operating in this field has been very steep and taken a number of 
casualties, but as those within the industry and academia gradually recognise the pitfalls of 
developing RM products and take more time to understand the mechanisms of investment, 
regulation and reimbursement, the greater their chances of commercial success.  
 
Future Perspective 
More than 20 years of hype over tissue engineering and regenerative therapies has masked 
the lack of success and certainty within the RM industry. However, reality has bitten and 
there now seems a consensus over the areas of uncertainty in the industry. As a result, the 
requirements for success should become clearer, especially in the UK where there are now 
many publically funded projects getting underway to resolve the business, regulatory and 
technical issues that are preventing these products from reaching market [116]. The 
regulatory landscape is ever evolving - there will never be a definitive set of requirements for 
RM due to the wide variability in product characteristics and their inherent risks. However, a 
greater understanding of the underlying science on the part of both the regulatory agencies 
and the developers of RM products will further elucidate challenging areas such as product 
characterisation [18]. Increased levels of confidence over the clarity of the regulatory 
landscape in the EU in particular may well lead to an increasing number of developers 
choosing to market in the Europe, with the ATMP regulation already having been road tested 
by Tigenix [117]. However, there will still be debate and limitations regarding which EU 
markets to choose to enter due to political, cultural and economic differences between 
member states. The continuing issues with gaining multiple favourable reimbursement 
decisions in the EU may also limit the uptake of RM products in certain countries, especially 
in those countries that operate under a strict cost-effectiveness regime such as the UK.  As a 
result, the USA will remain an attractive market to developers of RM products in the EU as it 
is still perceived to be less problematic due to the dominance of private payers and the fact 
that it is technically classed as a single market; despite the need to achieve many positive 
local coverage decisions [19]. However, with the likely US healthcare system reform due to 
spiralling costs, it has been suggested that the Obama administration will follow the example 
of the UK and introduce similar technology appraisal process to that of NICE, thus 
potentially reducing the appeal of the US market to developers of RM products [118]. 
Perhaps the greatest changes over the coming years will come in the form of the business and 
investment models used by companies operating in the RM space. Greater knowledge and 
experience gained from dealing with the challenges of COGS, regulatory requirements and 
reimbursement mechanisms will allow individual companies to make more realistic 
assumptions regarding the financial feasibility of their technologies, which in turn may 
reduce some of the risk to potential investors. As a result of this, investors may be able to 
make more informed judgements regarding their choice of technology and to then structure 
their investment in such a way that it will maximise the benefit to both themselves and the 
company developing the product. However, this may require a change in the way that both 
the developer and the investor operate given the protracted time to profitability for these 
potentially high value products.   
  
 
Executive Summary 
Scope 
- The scope of the term Regenerative Medicine (RM) as used in this manuscript, has 
been defined by the industrial partners and collaborators that were consulted in the 
research and development of these findings.  
- The majority of these collaborators were developing products that the authors of this 
manuscript have interpreted as having Regenerative Medicine (RM) applications 
- The products came in two categories; (1) products composed of either; viable human 
cells or tissues for therapeutic use or (2) non-viable biomaterials that would form 
tissue repair scaffolds (medical devices).  
 
Why is Regenerative Medicine Different? 
- The regenerative medicine industry is still searching for the right formula to achieve 
commercial success 
- Despite significant fund raising efforts and scientific discovery there are very few 
regenerative medicine products on the market  
- The EPSRC-funded remedi project was devised to take a holistic and collaborative 
approach to identifying many of the issues that act as barriers to commercialization 
and how they can be overcome 
- Due to the high-risk nature of this emerging industry, small companies should carry 
out significant due diligence on their commercial potential before using precious  
resource and time on a product that is unlikely to succeed  
  
 
The Importance of the Value Proposition  
- Small companies must satisfy a multiplicity of customers through the demonstration 
of value  
- The demonstration of value is best described as the value proposition (VP), which is 
defined as ‘the benefits offered to the customer, minus the cost and risk’ 
- There are three core elements to a successful VP; quality, safety and efficacy (in an 
addressable market) 
- Showing reimbursement value may be the most challenging part of the VP, as the 
requirements for efficacy and cost-effectiveness are relative to any incumbent 
technology and market size 
 
Business Models: Product or Service? 
- A lack of buy-in from big pharma has left companies with no choice but to “go it 
alone” in many cases 
-  It is likely that a new investment / business model would have to be created for RM 
in order to remove some of the burden of taking a product into the clinic and beyond 
- Companies now feel compelled to focus on cost-effectiveness and thus pricing, which 
could be detrimental as these are potentially high-value products and should not be 
sold short 
- Autologous therapies may seem like a service-based offering, but many companies 
developing autologous therapies see them as products as they blend product and 
procedure 
  
 
Gaining Private Investment 
- Companies should do their research and pick investors who are active in the RM or 
biotechnology space as they are more realistic in terms of their expectations  
- Companies should know what they are selling, whom they are selling it to and must 
understand the market  
- The CEO of a new start-up or spin out company should be as least as good a business 
man as they are a scientist  
- Venture capitalists have a 10-year funding cycle and it is vital to know at which stage 
of the cycle they are at as it will affect the level of investment and the timelines for 
the ROI 
 
Avoiding Cash Burn 
- Unnecessary staffing costs are one the easiest ways to burn cash in a new business 
and specialists should not be employed too early 
- Large product pipelines are useful when attracting investors but they can drain 
resources and compromise the focus and quality of the development work 
- University spin-out companies should remain in shelter for as long as possible to 
allow much of the important proof-of-concept and pre-clinical work to be carried out 
under grant funding 
- Protecting intellectual property should not come at the cost of the business unless is it 
imperative the survival of the business and there are funds available to defend the IP 
if needed 
  
 
The Evolving Regulatory Framework 
- The regulations can be used to drive the innovation of new RM products as there are 
opportunities to use the minimally-manipulated pathways, whereby clinical trials can 
be avoided  
-  The GMP regulations are currently being updated in the EU in order to provide a 
more complete set of manufacturing guidelines for developers of ATMPs 
- The FDA relies heavily on guidance as many of the GMP requirements were written 
for conventional pharmaceuticals and are not applicable to HCT/Ps 
- Interaction with the regulator is essential and the EMA provide many useful services 
to small companies including data certification and offer a 90% reduction in fees  
 
Reimbursement and Adoption  
- Small companies should consult health economics and reimbursement experts during 
the business planning stage to help prevent technologies that are unlikely to be 
reimbursed from reaching the market 
- Cost of goods sold will have a large impact on the pricing strategy for the company 
but achieving clinical effectiveness in an addressable market should still be the main 
focus of the treatment or therapy 
- The US healthcare system is currently dominated by private payers where as many of 
the EU member states are dominated by government-led healthcare providers, 
especially in the UK where NICE technology appraisals are likely to limit the uptake 
of RM products 
- The key to adoption may be the early engagement of clinicians and key opinion 
leaders so that the technology can be influenced in order to gain better a better fit with 
current practices  
Managing Setbacks 
- Regulation has proven to be one of the major areas of difficulty for developers but the 
evolution of the regulatory framework and the introduction of new legislation is 
gradually reducing the burden 
- Clinical trials involving hESCs are still proving difficult to initiate due to concerns 
over their safety but there is evidence that the regulatory agencies are becoming more 
experienced in dealing with these products  
- Flawed reimbursement strategies have held companies back in the past but the re-
emergence of Organogenesis from chapter 11 to have commercial success has shown 
that such setbacks are not always terminal  
- Large product pipelines are expensive to maintain and can place too much focus on 
the success of the lead product but streamlined development practices and smaller 
markets may provide an entry into the market provided there is sufficient clinical need 
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Table Legend 
Table 1 likely customer (stakeholder) requirements for developers of regenerative medicine 
products. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Patient 
- Better clinical outcome 
- Minimal cost 
- Minimal hospital time 
- Fewer interventions 
• Clinician 
- Better clinical outcome 
- Minimal cost 
- Clinical fit 
- Longer shelf-life 
- Fewer interventions 
• Regulator 
- Quality 
- Safety 
- Efficacy 
- Positive risk:benefit profile 
• Payer 
- Better clinical outcome 
- Cost–effectiveness 
- Minimal cost 
- Longer shelf-life 
- Fewer interventions 
• Investor 
- Market size/type 
- First-in-man  (Phase I) data 
- Animal data, human efficacy 
data 
- Regulatory approval 
- Cost–effectiveness data 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure Legend 
Figure 1 Regulatory pathways showing the major legislative requirements for both cell- and 
device-based regenerative medicine products in the EU and the US. This illustrates the 
reduced regulatory burden for lower risk medical devices (Class II) when compared to higher 
risk devices (Class III) and the greater regulatory burden for cell- and tissue-based products 
that have been manipulated or used in such a way to present sufficient risk to require clinical 
trials and market authorisation i.e. section 351 products in the US and ATMPs in the EU). 
This figure also highlights the historical lack of specific regulatory legislation to cover the 
GMP and GCP requirements for biological products, a situation that is now being addressed 
by the regulatory authorities.  
